On May 2, 1996, at Rocky Flats, process specialists in Building 707 opened an 8801 can inside an 8802 shipping canister sent from Building 559, and discovered 18 vials containing uranium oxide samples. The maximum criticality safety operating limit for Building 707 is 10 vials. The process specialists immediately replaced the lid on the 8801 can and notified the shift manager, who terminated plutonium operations. Failure to ascertain building packaging limitations when shipping material can create an unanticipated criticality hazard. (ORPS Report RFO--KHLL- PUFAB-1996-0058)
The shift manager posted an out-of-tolerance condition for Building 707 as a criticality infraction, notified criticality engineering, and directed the process specialists to empty the vials and move the bulk materials to another glovebox.
NFS reported similar instances in Weekly Summaries 96-18, 95-47, 95-08, 94-42, and 94-09 where allowable inventory limits were exceeded because of a shipment. On October 11, 1994, New Brunswick Laboratory personnel discovered that the quantity of recently received fissile material from offsite in the uranium facility packaging room exceeded the New Brunswick Laboratory criticality hazard control statement administrative limits for fissile material in the room. The quantity of fissile material in the packaging room was 946 grams; the administrative limit for the room is 350 grams. As a result of the event, New Brunswick Laboratory requires all incoming shipments of fissile material be approved and accompanied by the criticality safety representative or an alternate. They have developed a checklist, which they send to shippers of hazardous materials that must be completed in advance to communicate clearly what is being shipped and its form. (OE Weekly Summary 94-42 and ORPS Report CH--GOCH-NBL -1994-0003 AND 0004)
These events illustrate the importance of understanding technical and implementation requirements of safety authorization basis documents for the receiver of a shipment of fissile materials. NFS published Safety Notice DOE/EH0514, issue 95-05, "Department of Transportation Non- Compliances by Vendor Shippers," in December 1995 that discusses lessons learned regarding receipt of hazardous materials shipments. DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety, section 4.3.3, requires contractors to establish contractor criticality safety programs that address all the nuclides listed in table 4.3-1. DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, section 3.1, states that facilities should have administrative controls in place to ensure that threshold values for storage of fissile materials are not exceeded by introduction of new material. Managers at radiological facilities should verify that their programs ensure a level of control sufficient for compliance with their safety limits and that receiving organization standards are complied with regarding the packaging and marking of the shipment.
KEYWORDS: criticality safety, violation
FUNCTIONAL AREA: operations