On October 25, 1993, personnel at the Savannah River HB-Line discovered a 50- microcurie cesium-137 radioactive source stored in a locked cabinet without proper documentation. The source was used by Fire Department personnel to test the liquid level of facility halon bottles, and the site source control coordinator believed it to be the responsibility of the Fire Department. Fire Department personnel believed it to be the responsibility of the facility. Because of this misunderstanding, the source was not in the source accountability database, nor was there any documentation on it at the facility. (ORPS Report SR--WSRC-HBLINE-1993-0033)
Personnel at the HB-Line discovered this discrepancy after being contacted by personnel at the FB-Line facility. On October 16, 1993 facility, personnel at the Savannah River FB- Line also determined that a sealed 50-microcurie cesium-137 source transported into the facility by the Fire Department was not in compliance with the source control program. Upon discovery, facility personnel removed the source from the Fire Department cabinet, entered it into the FB-Line source control program, and stored it in a locked source safe. (ORPS Report SR--WSRC-FBLINE-1993-0047)
On October 21, 1993, a radiation safety officer at Louisiana State University (LSU) reported several accounting discrepancies to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning the number and curie content of plutonium-beryllium sources stored at the university. During preparation for disposal of the radioactive sources to the Los Alamos National Laboratory, University personnel discovered a discrepancy between the records at LSU and at the Laboratory. The officer noted LSU records indicated that the University possessed ten sources with a total plutonium content of 320 grams, which is in accordance with the NRC license. Los Alamos records indicated that the University should have eleven sources and that the curie content of one source did not correlate with LSU records. Event investigators determined that one source was misidentified: it was a two-curie source instead of a one-curie source. University personnel continued to search for the missing source. In addition, they revised the total curie content to 336 grams of plutonium and applied for an amendment to their license. (NRC Event Number 26250)
NS has reported numerous events associated with the control and accountability of radioactive sources in the OE Weekly Summary. In several instances, workers received unplanned radiation exposure. These events involved improper storage; loss of accountability; incorrect labeling, shipping, and receipt inspection; improper disposal; inadequate postings for storage areas; access control weaknesses; training deficiencies; and lack of procedural guidance for controlling sources. NS is currently developing a Safety Notice related to the control and accountability of radioactive sources. If you have any information concerning this subject (e.g., good practices), please contact Dick Trevillian at 301-903-3074.